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1. Introduction 
 
In Book I of his Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Aristotle defines happiness, or 
eudaimonia, in accordance with an argument he makes regarding the 
distinctive function of human beings.1 In this paper, I argue that, despite this 
argument, there are moments in the NE where Aristotle appeals to elements 
of eudaimonia that don’t follow from the “function argument” itself. The 
place of these elements in Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia should, 
therefore, be a matter of perplexity. For, how can Aristotle appeal to elements 
of eudaimonia not entailed by his argument for what eudaimonia involves? 
I examine two instances that exemplify the sort of appeal to outside 
elements that I have in mind. The first deals with Aristotle’s reference, in NE, 
I, 8, to certain goods—ancestry, children, beauty—goods unrelated to man’s 
function or his fulfillment of it, but nevertheless required for his happiness. 
The second instance involves pleasure. Aristotle makes various arguments in 
Books I and X of the NE that tie pleasure to the activity of the soul, and the 
function argument in turn. However, none of these arguments succeeds in 
demonstrating that pleasure necessarily follows from this activity. Taken 
together, these two examples demonstrate that Aristotle’s definition of 
happiness is more inclusive than his function argument permits.2 

1 Thomson (2004). 
2 Whether Aristotle’s view of eudaimonia is “inclusive” of multiple goods has been a 
subject of considerable controversy in the literature. See, for instance, Ackrill’s 
published address Ackrill (2010), 33-52. Ackrill presents Aristotle’s view of the 
eudaimon life as “inclusive,” and hence, not improbably limited to acts of 
contemplative thought (theôria), as others have argued. But even the inclusivity of 
Ackrill’s account is still limited to virtuous activities of some kind and thus cannot 
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2. Good Ancestry, Good Children, and Personal Beauty  
 
Aristotle’s inclusion of goods like ancestry, children, and beauty in his 
account of eudaimonia is by no means intuitive. For, none of these goods 
necessarily follow from Aristotle’s argument for what eudaimonia consists of. 
This argument, often referred to as the “function (ergon) argument,” can be 
summarized as follows: the good of any X involves X performing its 
distinctive or characteristic ergon well, that is, virtuously (1097b24-8); man’s 
ergon can neither be life nor sentience since man shares these functions with 
plants and animals respectively (1097b34-1098a4); by elimination then, 
man’s ergon must be the activity of his rational soul (1098a7-8); therefore, 
man’s highest good, eudaimonia, is achieved through the virtuous activity of 
his rational soul (1098a17-8).3 
Given this definition of eudaimonia, Aristotle’s appeal to ancestry and the 
like appears out of place. None of these advantages seem required for activity 
of the rational soul, nor for that activity to have been performed well. It is 
possible to imagine that a person, Mr. X, engages his rational soul in the 
virtuous performance of various activities, despite his being an ugly, childless 
fellow of low birth. And if Mr. X engages himself as we have imagined, and 
thereby fulfills his ergon in precisely the way Aristotle argues he ought, then 
whatever prevents him from achieving eudaimonia cannot be traced to the 
ergon argument itself. Thus, Aristotle’s reference to such advantages must be 
considered an addendum to the ergon argument, an added stipulation about 
the nature of eudaimonia that does not follow from any of the argument’s 
premises. 
One way to avoid the conclusion that Aristotle invokes ancestry and other 
such advantages as an addendum to his ergon argument would be to classify 
these advantages as the ‘external goods’ (ta ektos agatha) Aristotle insists it 
would be impossible “to do fine deeds without.” (1099a33-4) One could then 
argue, as Richard Kraut does in his article “Aristotle’s Ethics,” that “one’s 
virtuous activity will be to some extent diminished…if one lacks an adequate 
supply of other goods...Someone who is friendless, childless [etc.]…will 
simply not be able to find many opportunities for virtuous activity…To some 

accommodate certain elements Aristotle seems to want to capture in his definition 
of eudaimonia. These elements—beauty, pleasure, etc.—are not, as I argue, integral 
to virtuous activity but nevertheless must be for Aristotle’s view to be consistent. 
3 My understanding of the ergon argument is indebted to Deborah Achtenberg’s 
formulation of it in Deborah (1989). 
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extent, then, living well requires good fortune.”4 
On Kraut’s reading, a definition of eudaimonia that involved things like 
ancestry, children, and beauty would follow from the ergon argument insofar 
as these things are necessary for the virtuous fulfillment of one’s function. 
However, it is also possible to read Aristotle’s appeal to these advantages as 
different in kind from his appeal to ‘external goods,’ making the former’s 
role in eudaimonia appear incidental. Indeed, in NE, I 8, Aristotle invokes the 
necessity of ‘external goods’ and then moves on to discuss the necessity of 
certain other advantages, advantages a person requires for his life to be 
‘blessed.’ (makarios) As Aristotle writes: 
 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that happiness needs the addition of external 
goods, as we have said; for it is difficult if not impossible to do fine deeds 
without any resources. Many can only be done as it were by instruments—
by the help of friends, or wealth, or political influence. There are also 
certain advantages, such as good ancestry or good children, or personal 
beauty, the lack of which mars our felicity; for a man is scarcely happy if 
he is very ugly to look at, or of low birth, or solitary and childless 
(1099a32-1099b4). 
 
In this passage, Aristotle seems to refer to two classes of things that he 
believes an adequate account of eudaimonia demands. The first class 
involves the ‘external goods’ of Kraut’s reading, those ‘resources’ 
(achorigitos) or ‘instruments’ (organa) man must avail himself of in order to 
“do fine deeds.” These goods are necessary for the fulfillment of man’s ergon, 
and hence, they are also (per the ergon argument) necessary for eudaimonia. 
The second class of goods, however, that of things like ancestry, children, 
and beauty, is the class Aristotle believes to be required for a ‘blessed’ 
existence, and for eudaimonia in turn. Significantly, Aristotle does not 
connect this latter class with the performance of actions. He does not 
associate ancestry, children, or beauty with the language of instruments or a 
dearth of resources. 
It is this lack of association and Aristotle’s progression from the first set of 
goods (friends, wealth, political influence) to the second (ancestry, children, 
beauty) that, taken together, indicate a distinction in kind between Kraut’s 
external goods and the type of goods invoked in the latter part of the passage. 
Thus, Aristotle does not present ancestry, children, and beauty as 
instrumental to the performance of actions, and hence, he does not connect 

4 Kraut (2014). 
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these goods to the ergon argument either. Indeed, he appeals, as I have tried 
to show, to an element of eudaimonia that does not follow from his ergon 
argument for what eudaimonia involves. 
Admittedly, several translators of the NE are divided over how to gloss the 
above passage. For instance, Terrence Irwin and W. D. Ross’ translations 
retain the sense of two classes of goods, while Roger Crisp and Robert C. 
Bartlett’s translations do not.5 One reason to prefer the Thomson translation 
cited earlier in this paper, however, is that it may explain Aristotle’s 
reference to a makarios existence. If, as Ross and H. H. Joachim have argued, 
Aristotle uses the term makarios specifically to designate a state of virtuous 
activity sweetened by ‘good fortune’ (eutuchia), then the goods of the 
passage’s latter half can be grouped together as advantages dependent upon 
fortune, that is, dependent upon providence or luck.6 Friends, wealth, and 
political influence can be acquired—ancestry, fertility, and beauty less so. As 
regards fertility, even if it is noble children that Aristotle has in mind good 
parenting can only do so much. 
In the last sentence of NE, I, 8 Aristotle makes this association between 
fortune and the ‘certain advantages’ of the passage more explicit, writing that 
“as we said, happiness seems to require this sort of prosperity too; which is 
why some identify it with good fortune, although others identify it with 
virtue.” (1099b7-9) Given that this statement follows Aristotle’s discussion 
of good ancestry and the like, we may infer that it is indeed these latter sorts 
of advantages that Aristotle believes people associate with fortune. That is, 
some people, or so the argument goes, think happiness includes advantages 
such as good ancestry. And yet, one can’t possess a thing like good ancestry 
without the help of fortune. Therefore, one can’t account for happiness 
without accounting for the role fortune plays in its promotion. 
Notice also that Aristotle then refers to the view of happiness that involves 
virtue in order to contrast it with the view of happiness that involves fortune. 
The goods that some people think are essential for happiness—those that 
depend on fortune—these goods explain “why some identify it [i.e. happiness] 
with good fortune.” “[A]lthough,” there are other people who think that the 
goods essential for happiness depend on virtue, and hence, these people 
“identify it [i.e. happiness] with virtue.” There is then, in the construction of 
this final sentence of NE, I, 8, a syntactic distinction made between the goods 
of fortune, goods like personal beauty and the like, and the goods of virtue. 

5 Irwin (1985); Ross (1980); Crisp (2000); Bartlett and Collins (2011). 
6 Gavertsson (2013). 
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Moreover, it is this syntactic distinction which supports the reading I have 
offered in the following way. Ancestry, children, and beauty can be 
disassociated from the virtuous activity of the ergon argument inasmuch as 
people associate these goods with fortune and thereby disassociate them from 
virtue. 
It is true that Aristotle does not explicitly endorse the association of good 
ancestry with fortune; he says merely that ‘some’ people do. But Aristotle 
does not oppose this association either, nor is he typically shy about opposing 
conventional, or even authoritative, assumptions he disagrees with.7 It seems 
more plausible that Aristotle cites, without qualification, this connection 
between ‘certain advantages’ and fortune because it is one with which he is 
comfortable. Whether ancestry, fertility, and beauty can be grouped together 
as blessings of fortune, however, it is still the case that Aristotle invokes 
these goods independently of his ergon argument and thereby expands his 
ergonistic account of eudaimonia. 
Admittedly, I have so far only identified this class of goods (good ancestry 
and the like) as it appears in a single passage in a single book of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. But if this class genuinely signifies a category of 
importance for Aristotle, if it is indeed a robust and stubborn counterexample 
to the ergon argument, one would expect it to recur elsewhere in the NE. 
Consider, therefore, the following passage in NE, VII, 13 where, in a context 
markedly like the one under consideration, Aristotle alludes to a class of 
goods essential for happiness. Note also, and especially, Aristotle’s 
invocation of fortune and compare it with the mention in NE, I, 8 of a 
makarios existence and the subsequent association Aristotle makes between 
fortune and happiness. 
 
This is why everybody assumes that the happy life is a pleasant life, i.e. 
makes pleasure a constituent of happiness—with good reason. For no 
activity is perfect if it is impeded and happiness is a perfect thing. That is 
why the happy man needs (besides his other qualifications) physical 
advantages as well as external goods and the gifts of fortune, so that he 
may not be hampered by lack of these things (1153b14-20; emphasis mine). 
 
Here the order and structure of Aristotle’s remarks are strikingly like the 
order and structure of our passage in NE, I, 8. In both, Aristotle begins by 

7 E.g.: “Cultured people, however, and men of affairs identify the good with honor 
because this is (broadly speaking) the goal of political life. Yet it appears to be too 
superficial to be the required answer (1095b23-4; emphasis mine).” 
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discussing pleasure (1099a8-30; 1153b1-15). In both, Aristotle proceeds to 
the essential role of certain ‘external goods’ in happiness (1099a33; 1153b19). 
Finally, in both, Aristotle moves on to the goods bestowed on us by fortune. 
With respect to NE, I, 8, I argued that blessings of beauty and the like are 
categorically distinct from ‘external goods’ because of (among other things) 
their association with fortune, and the way Aristotle appears to move on to 
these goods of fortune from his consideration of ‘external goods.’ 
In NE, VII, 13 both this association with fortune and this sense of moving 
on is retained. Indeed, here Aristotle calls these goods ‘gifts of fortune,’ 
which as I have argued is already in NE, I, 8 associated with goods like 
personal beauty, both because of the latter goods’ contribution to a makarios 
existence and because of the connection Aristotle makes between fortune and 
happiness at the end of NE, I, 8 (1099b8). As far as the sense of moving on is 
concerned this too is implied, albeit glancingly, in the phrase, “That is why 
the happy man needs (besides his other qualifications) physical advantages as 
well as external goods and the gifts of fortune.” (1153b19; emphasis mine) 
This sense of distinction between ‘external goods’  and ‘gifts of fortune’ 
denoted by the conjunction ‘and’ is also echoed by Bartlett, Crisp, and 
Irwin’s translations of NE.8 For both these reasons—Aristotle’s reference to 
fortune and his moving on from external goods—the NE, VII, 13 passage 
should be read as an echo of NE, I, where, while cataloging eudaimonia’s 
various features, Aristotle invokes goods like personal beauty shortly after 
his consideration of pleasure. Thus, the category of advantages Aristotle 
originally refers to in NE, I, 8 is not a standalone anomaly, but is rather a 
stable and recurring class of goods substantially featured in Aristotle’s 
account of eudaimonia, yet not in his argument for what eudaimonia involves. 
John M. Cooper, in his article “Aristotle on the Goods of Fortune,” also 
sees Aristotle as making a distinction between the two classes of goods I 
have tried to differentiate above.9 Cooper and I disagree, however, on what 
this distinction amounts to. The distinction between goods like wealth on the 
one hand, and advantages like beauty on the other, is rooted for Cooper in the 
role both play in virtuous activity. Goods like wealth help a person perform 
virtuous actions, while beauty, and advantages like it, give a person more 
opportunity to perform virtuous actions in the first place (182). For Cooper, 
both classes of goods can then be integrated into the ergon argument because 

8  Ross diverges here, equating ‘external goods’ with ‘those of fortune’ in his 
translation of the passage in Ross (1980), 92. 
9 Cooper (1985). 
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both enable a person to act virtuously. Cooper’s view, if it is correct, would 
then invalidate my own view that there is a class of goods required for 
eudaimonia that cannot be incorporated into Aristotle’s argument for how 
eudaimonia should be defined. 
There are problems with Cooper’s view, however. It is unclear why 
advantages like beauty, birth, and children give a person ampler opportunity 
to act virtuously. Cooper explains by saying that a beautiful person, for 
instance, has more occasion to practice the virtue of temperance (sôphrosunê) 
when it comes to sex because such a person is so often beset by admirers 
(182). But there are other opportunities for virtue that a person is afforded by 
lacking beauty. A Mr. X who is routinely bullied because of his looks will 
have more occasion to exercise the virtue of patience (praots) in his social 
interactions than a Mr. Y who is the matinee idol of his generation. Indeed, 
one can readily imagine how the converse of each advantage Aristotle 
mentions might offer someone equally many opportunities to exercise 
equally many virtues. 
Unlike Cooper, Jiyuan Yu acknowledges the existence of goods 
unaccounted for by the ergon argument but nonetheless required for 
eudaimonia (54). 10  For Yu, though, this is not, as I have argued, an 
inconsistency on Aristotle’s part, but is rather an indication that there are two 
conceptions of eudaimonia in the NE (68). The first conception describes the 
contemplative existence to which a person should aspire. This existence, 
though primarily realized in a life of virtuous contemplation, requires—in 
order to be livable—goods not proper to contemplation per se. This is 
Aristotle’s inclusive conception of eudaimonia. 
Aristotle’s second conception of eudaimonia applies solely to the 
happiness of reason and is unconcerned with the happiness of a livable 
human life (67). But if the NE has two conceptions of eudaimonia—one 
inclusive, the other intellectual—then the goods I have claimed the ergon 
argument cannot account for may simply belong to Aristotle’s inclusive 
conception. For, on Yu’s reading, though the ergon argument explicates 
intellectual happiness it does not wholly determine which goods are integral 
to the happiness of a human life (68).  
There are, however, good reasons to resist Yu’s reading and the objection 
that follows from it. There are passages in the NE which strongly imply that 
Aristotle intends to develop only one notion of eudaimonia—not two as Yu 
suggests. Moreover, several of these passages are found in the introductory 

10 Yu (2003), 51-74. 
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section of the NE, a section Aristotle concludes with the following: “So much 
by way of introductory remarks about ... the proposed course.” (1095a14) As 
is often the case, and as the phrase ‘proposed course’ implies, Aristotle’s 
prefatory remarks identify the goal and plan of his work as a whole. These 
remarks should then be considered authoritative when it comes to 
determining what sort of account of happiness Aristotle intends to offer and 
whether his intention is to offer more than one. 
In NE, I, 1 Aristotle characterizes his ethical investigation as ‘a kind of 
political science.’ (1094b11-12) In NE, I, 3, Aristotle expands on this by 
describing the sort of discipline political science is and what it demands of its 
students. Aristotle cautions that “a young man is not a fit person to attend 
lectures on political science, because he is not versed in the practical business 
of life from which politics draws its premises and subject-matter.” (1095a2-4) 
Given that Aristotle classifies ethics as political science and describes 
political science as concerned with the “practical business of life,” it is wrong 
for Yu to suppose, that the NE is divided between two conceptions of 
happiness and that one of these conceptions has only to do with the happiness 
of reason—reason as separate from the lived experiences of human beings. 
The object of Aristotle’s investigation is the happiness of human life and it is 
this happiness that Aristotle gives an account of. 
 
 
3. Pleasure 
 
Pleasure (hedonê) stands out as another example in which Aristotle appeals 
to a feature of eudaimonia not entailed by the ergon argument. The 
connection between a person engaging his rational soul in virtuous activity 
and deriving pleasure from this activity is admittedly intuitive. However, I 
believe Aristotle intends to make this connection necessary. After all, if one 
of the goals of the NE is to offer an account of eudaimonia’s essential 
constitution, then eudaimonia cannot be what it is without being so 
constituted. Thus, I believe Aristotle intends to demonstrate that eudaimonia 
entails some form of pleasure, and it is with this entailment in mind that, he 
lays out the following reductio ad ridiculum argument. “It is obvious also 
that if pleasure…is not a good, then the life of the happy man will not be 
pleasant—for why should he need pleasure if it is not a good, and his life 
may equally well be a painful one? For pain is neither good nor bad if 
pleasure is neither too. Why, then, should he avoid it [i.e. pain]?” (1154a2-5) 
The idea that a person spends her entire life in pain and is still eudaimon is, 
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of course, ridiculous, and hence, untenable.11 But if a eudaimon existence is 
untenable without the attainment of some pleasure and the (concomitant) 
avoidance of some pain, then pleasure is in a sense required for eudaimonia.  
Thus, Aristotle offers several arguments in the NE, three of them in NE, I, 
8, that present pleasure as an inevitable complement to eudaimonia. The first 
argument of NE, I, 8 proceeds thusly. The life of the eudaimon man Mr. X—
who engages his rational soul in virtuous activity—is inherently pleasurable 
insofar as Mr. X is a lover of virtue. For, just as horses give pleasure to lovers 
of horses, so too does virtuous activity give pleasure to lovers of virtue 
(1099a8-12). The ergon argument, however, defines the eudaimon man as 
virtuous, but not necessarily as a lover of virtue. In NE, I, 7, where Aristotle 
proposes his ergon argument, Aristotle analogizes man’s virtue to the virtue 
of various artists, contending that each is virtuous relative to how well he 
performs his function. The virtue of a flautist, for instance, depends on how 
well he performs with his flute.12 The virtue of a person depends on how 
well he performs with his rational soul (1097b25-9). 
By this analogy, virtue is a perfection, but not necessarily a predilection. 
One can be an excellent flautist and still hate playing the flute, just as one can 
be an excellent human and still hate fulfilling one’s ergon in accordance with 
virtue. Thus, the argument that the virtuous person will derive pleasure from 
acting virtuously fails to conclusively tie pleasure to eudaimonia insofar as 
the virtuous person’s love of virtue is a matter of contingency. 
The second argument of NE, I, 8 asserts that virtuous actions are inherently 
pleasurable and that virtuous people will lead pleasurable lives just by 
performing them (1099a14). But it is not at all clear why we should assume 
the premise that virtuous actions are inherently pleasurable. Some actions 
that Aristotle may well consider virtuous are bound to be discomforting if not 
downright distressing for the person performing them. The courage (andreia) 
it takes to rescue a helpless child from a burning building may be laudable, 
but it is hard to see how it is necessarily pleasurable for the rescuer, even if 
she “faces and fears … the right things for the right reason and in the right 
way and at the right time.” (1115b18-20) This second argument too, then, 
fails to conclusively join pleasure to the ergon argument, insofar as virtuous 
activity is only contingently pleasurable. 

11 Note that Aristotle does not here establish pleasure as the supreme good. Pleasure 
is a good the happy person will have some share in, but it is not a good sufficient 
for her happiness. 
12 “The Greek aulos was not a flute but a reed instrument” Thomson (2004), 15n1. 
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Aristotle’s third argument in NE, I, 8 claims that, by definition, a virtuous 
person takes pleasure in behaving virtuously and that we only ever refer to 
people as virtuous in such cases. “[F]or nobody,” Aristotle insists, “would 
say that a man is just unless he enjoys acting justly, nor liberal (eleutheriots) 
unless he enjoys liberal actions, and similarly in all the other cases. If this is 
so, virtuous actions must be pleasurable in themselves.” (1099a18-22) But 
here too, there is no compelling reason to assume Aristotle’s premise. 
Granted, we may want to say that Mr. X must be genuinely inclined to 
behave as he does in cases of moral action. A person terribly embittered, for 
instance, by an act of charity (or liberality in Thomson’s translation) cannot 
really be said to be charitable. But in the case of some of the other 
Aristotelian virtues, no such requirement obtains. For surely Euclid’s claim to 
epistêmê (the virtue of scientific knowledge) would not be in doubt if it 
turned out that he detested mathematical inquiry. Again, as in the case of the 
flautist, a talent for something does not entail a preference for it. Here too, 
then, Aristotle has not proven that pleasure and virtuous activity must go 
hand in hand. It remains an open question, therefore, how Aristotle may 
appeal to elements of eudaimonia, which do not follow from the ergon 
argument that defines it. 
Aristotle returns to the question of pleasure and virtuous activity in Book 
X of the NE but here too, as I argue, fails to establish a necessary connection 
between the two. Aristotle begins to address this connection in NE, X, 4, 
asserting that activity is accompanied by pleasure “so long…as the object of 
thought or sensation, and that which judges or contemplates, are in the right 
condition.” (1174b35-7) It is not clear from this context what ‘right condition’ 
Aristotle has in mind, what, in other words, would have to be true of a given 
activity for pleasure to occur. However, there are several reasons to think that 
pleasurable activity does not, for Aristotle, demand extraordinary circumstances. 
In NE, VII, 13 Aristotle writes that “the unimpeded exercise of a faculty is 
a pleasure (1153b14; emphasis mine).” From this context, at least, it seems as 
if the wrong conditions for pleasure may only amount to some form of 
infirmity or abnormality. Also telling, and to some extent confirmatory of 
this reading, is the question Aristotle poses in NE, X, 4’s next paragraph, 
namely, “How is it … that nobody feels pleasure continuously?” (1174a4) A 
view of pleasure that regards pleasure’s absence as perplexing cannot 
demand a singular set of circumstances for pleasure’s presence. Thus, for 
both these reasons the ‘right condition’ for pleasurable activity ought not to 
be too refined. 
And yet, if Aristotle indeed presents pleasurable activity as ordinary, as 
nothing more remarkable than ‘the unimpeded exercise of a faculty,’ how 
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assured can such a connection between pleasure and activity be? At the end 
of NE, X, 4 Aristotle goes further in assuring this connection, claiming that 
just “as pleasure does not occur without activity, so every activity is perfected 
by its pleasure.” (1175a20-2) The proposition is twofold: no pleasure without 
activity; no activity without pleasure. Of course, it is possible to interpret the 
second half of this proposition as more tentative: “every activity may be 
improved by its complementary pleasure,” rather than, “every activity is 
improved by the pleasure that necessarily accompanies it.” However, I think 
the latter reading makes better sense of the quotation’s context. 
Directly before this statement on pleasure and activity, Aristotle writes, 
“Whether we choose life on account of pleasure or pleasure on account of life 
is a question that may be dismissed at the moment; for it appears they are 
closely connected and do not admit of separation.” (1175a19-20) The same, 
as I have argued, can be said for pleasure and activity: they are, for Aristotle, 
“closely connected and do not admit of separation.” And indeed, this is 
precisely the connection Aristotle must establish if pleasure is to genuinely 
follow from the ergon argument. For if pleasure is an essential component of 
human happiness then pleasure should be entailed by the argument for what 
happiness involves. 
I do not, however, think we can accept Aristotle’s account of necessarily 
pleasurable activity. Even granting the caveat Aristotle is careful to offer, that 
we don’t constantly experience pleasure because we become desensitized to 
the ordinary objects of sensation and cognition, there is still more that would 
need to be said to establish that we necessarily experience pleasure when 
engaging with objects for the first time (1175a5-11).13 The character of this 
engagement, and hence, under what precise conditions Aristotle expects 
pleasure to arise, is admittedly somewhat difficult to specify. However, as I 
have argued, Aristotle’s ‘unimpeded exercise of a faculty’ indicates that even 
ordinary instances of sensation and cognition should qualify. Indeed W.D. 
Ross, in his book Aristotle, appears to agree: “When one of our senses is in a 
healthy state and is engaged on an object which is good of its kind (e.g., a 
distinctly visible object), the activity of that sense is necessarily most 
pleasant, and the same is true of the activity of thought. And the pleasure 
completes the activity.”14 
And yet, there are simply so many objects that give a person no pleasure at 
all, even on first exposure, and even when that person’s faculties are actively 

13 Ross (1995). 
14 Ross (1995), 236. 
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engaged and fully functioning. Say Mr. X comes into contact for the first 
time with a doorstop which, as Ross specifies, “is good of its kind.” The 
doorstop is distinctly visible and it stops doors with all the alacrity and 
aplomb one could want. And yet, Mr. X is thoroughly unmoved, indeed 
totally indifferent to the supposed pleasures of the doorstop, the very 
pleasures his faculties ought now to be engaging with for the first time. This 
counterexample—Mr. X and his indifference—casts doubt on the point 
Aristotle has tried to establish, that pleasure accompanies activities (even 
certain sorts of activities) inevitably.15 
 
4. Goods vs. Pleasure 
 
There may appear to be an important difference between the point I have 
made about beauty and the like and the point I have made about Aristotle’s 
treatment of pleasure. Regarding good ancestry, good children, and personal 
beauty, I argued that Aristotle characterizes eudaimonia in ways exogenous 
to his ergon argument, thereby disregarding his functional definition of 
eudaimonia. With respect to pleasure, however, I argued that Aristotle fails in 
his attempt to make pleasure endogenous to the ergon argument. Aristotle 
doesn’t disregard the function argument per se, but rather comes up short in 
his effort to conclusively tie pleasure to it.  
One may, therefore, objects to my criticism of pleasure as out of keeping 
with my criticism of beauty and the like. For there is a difference between 
identifying an inconsistency on Aristotle’s part—including things like good 
ancestry in eudaimonia but not in the human ergon—and attacking those 
arguments Aristotle makes to remain consistent, arguments that link pleasure 
with the function of human beings. One might then accuse my latter attack on 
pleasure as an instance of trifling disagreement rather than an instance of real 
insight into the structural inconsistencies of Aristotelian eudaimonia. It is one 
thing to question the assumed premises of Aristotle’s case for pleasure and 
another thing, a more compelling thing, to demonstrate that beauty and the 
like’s inclusion in eudaimonia breaks the rules Aristotle’s own ergon 
argument has established. There is good reason, however, to think that the 
difference between my criticism of beauty and pleasure is not as significant 

15 Anscombe, in her inimitably concise way, also noted the trouble pleasure seemed 
to give “the ancients,” writing that it “reduced Aristotle to sheer babble about ‘the 
bloom on the cheek of youth’ because, for good reasons, he wanted to make it out 
both identical with and different from the pleasurable activity” Anscombe, (1958), 3. 
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as it may seem. 
Aristotle himself doesn’t appear convinced that he has adequately 
assimilated pleasure into his ergon argument. Indeed, in NE, I, 8 alone 
Aristotle makes, as we have seen, several arguments for pleasure’s 
connection to virtuous activity (and the function argument in turn). Then, in 
NE, X, Aristotle returns to the relationship between pleasure and activity and 
offers further evidence of a necessary connection between the two. The sheer 
number and variety of Aristotle’s arguments is some indication of how 
inconclusive he felt each individual argument to be.16 
This acknowledged inconclusiveness would then amount to a disregard for 
the ergon argument itself, at least insofar as the inclusion of pleasure in 
eudaimonia is concerned. For, if all the necessary features of eudaimonia are 
entailed by the successful fulfillment of a person’s function, and pleasure is 
only contingently related to this function, then Aristotle can only include 
pleasure by means of importing it into his definition of eudaimonia 
irrespective of its relationship to the ergon argument itself. Thus, if Aristotle 
did recognize the uncertainty of pleasure’s connection to the function 
argument, then the distinction between my criticisms of pleasure and 
personal beauty begins to recede. For now, in both cases, Aristotle must 
ultimately disregard the role of the ergon argument in defining his view of 
happiness. 
Evidence for this Aristotelian ambivalence over pleasure’s relation to the 
function argument can be found in NE, I, 8 where, as I have said, Aristotle’s 
rapid proliferation of arguments betrays his dissatisfaction with any single 
one of the arguments connecting pleasure to virtuous activity. Aristotle 
begins by asserting that the lover of virtue’s fondness for virtuous activity 
will result in pleasure whenever that activity is engaged in (1099a8). Not six 
lines below this Aristotle claims that virtuous actions are also “pleasant by 
nature” and will, therefore, be inherently pleasurable to all who perform them 
(1099a14). 
Consider again Aristotle’s first argument, that the lover of virtue, by 

16 I am hardly alone in regarding the multiplication of arguments for a single 
proposition as a liability. Kant writes in the Metaphysics of Morals, for instance, 
that “it is a highly unphilosophical expedient to resort to a number of proofs for 
one and the same proposition, consoling oneself that the multitude of reasons 
makes up for the inadequacy of any one of them taken by itself; for this indicates 
trickery and insincerity. When different insufficient reasons are, juxtaposed, one 
does not compensate for the deficiency of the others for certainty or even for 
probability.” Kant (1996), 6:403-404. 
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definition, takes pleasure in virtuous activity.17 In this case, pleasure would 
only ever be an incidental accessory to eudaimonia. Pleasure is a part of 
some people’s—the virtue lover’s—happiness only because of the lover’s 
disposition toward virtue, that is, only because she takes pleasure in behaving 
virtuously. Indeed, in this case, the eudaimon life would only “have pleasure 
attached to it as a sort of accessory.” (1099a16-7) It is then to shore up the 
internal connection between pleasure and virtue that Aristotle, very shortly 
thereafter, argues that pleasure is immanent to virtuous action itself and not 
merely to the disposition of the virtuous actor. 
We can understand this latter argument as anticipating the above objection: 
that pleasure is not an ingredient of happiness but, given the right type of 
person, an accessory to it. Thus, Aristotle makes his case for the union of 
pleasure and virtuous activity through a progressive accumulation of 
arguments, and it is Aristotle’s felt need for accumulation that, as I have tried 
to show, indicates his awareness of the objections to which the NE’s case for 
pleasure is subject. I think it more plausible, therefore, to treat personal 
beauty and pleasure as of a piece, as two elements incorporated in Aristotle’s 
definition of happiness but not, even inevitably not, in his ergon argument. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
It has been the aim of this paper to expose a certain perplexity regarding 
Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia: how Aristotle’s description of man’s 
ultimate good appears to diverge, at times, from the ergon argument intended 
to sustain it. Things like ancestry, children, and beauty, the feeling of 
pleasure—these were goods Aristotle evidently thought any adequate 
definition of eudaimonia should include, but, as I have tried to show, these 
same goods were more incidental to Aristotle’s own definition of eudaimonia 
than he would have liked.18 

17 Loving something, for Aristotle, already entails taking pleasure in it. As Aristotle 
writes, “each individual finds pleasure in that of which he is said to be fond” 
(1099a7-8). 
18 I am deeply grateful to Tim O’Keefe for his helpful comments and suggestions on 
an earlier draft of this paper. I am also indebted to Zachary Margulies for his kind 
assistance with the original Greek. Thanks also to the referees who reviewed this 
paper and gave me much needed feedback. Finally, I am obliged to the editor in 
chief of JGRS, Kim Chang-Sung, who has been generous and understanding 
throughout the publication process. 
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[Abstract] 
 
 
The Limits of Eudaimonia in  
the Nicomachean Ethics 
 
 
 
Daniel Schwartz 
 
 
In Book I of his Nicomachean Ethics (NE) Aristotle defines happiness, or 
eudaimonia, in accordance with an argument he makes regarding the 
distinctive function of human beings. In this paper, I argue that, despite this 
argument, there are moments in the NE where Aristotle appeals to elements 
of happiness that don’t follow from the function argument itself. The place of 
these elements in Aristotle’s account of happiness should, therefore, be a 
matter of perplexity. For, how can Aristotle appeal to elements of happiness 
not entailed by his argument for what happiness involves? I will examine two 
instances that exemplify the sort of appeal to outside elements that I have in 
mind. The first deals with Aristotle’s reference, in NE, I, 8, to certain 
goods—ancestry, children, beauty—goods unrelated to man’s function or his 
fulfillment of it, but nevertheless required for his happiness. The second 
instance involves pleasure. Aristotle makes various arguments, both in Books 
I and X of the NE, that tie pleasure to the activity of the soul, and the function 
argument in turn. However, none of these arguments succeeds in 
demonstrating that pleasure would necessarily follow from this activity. 
Taken together then, these two examples demonstrate the extent to which 
Aristotle’s definition of happiness is more inclusive than his function 
argument permits. 
 
[Key words]: Nicomachean Ethics, eudaimonia, Aristotle, ergon argument, 
pleasure 
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